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NON-TRIVIAL EQUILIBRIUM IN AN ECONOMY WITH STOCHASTIC RATIONING
Seppo Honkapohja and Takatoshi Ito
Abstract
Stochastic rationing when the market does not clear draws attention
because both Drèze (1975) and Benassy (1975) quantity-constrainedequilibria
have some undesirable features. Gale (1978)gave the existence proof of
trade under uncertainty. His stochastic rationing dependson all the indivi-
dual effective demands. It is toovague to characterize a rationing mechanism.
Moreover, his assumption to ensure a non-trivial equilibrium iseconomically
not clear.
In this paper we extend Green (1978) tocharacterizing the rationing
scheme as the individual effective demand times therationing number which is a
function of the aggregate quantity signals. We alsoconstruct an economy with
money and overlapping generations. We show the existence of the non—trivial
equilibrium and provide an example of a non-Wairasianequilibriim at the
Walrasjan :equi1ibn.um prices.
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One of the key features in the disequilibrium theory is to face the
fact that trades take place before all the markets clear through the
Walrasian tatonnement process. Moreover, we usually assume the fixed price
and the quantity adjustments in the short run. By quantity adjustments we
mean the revision of individual optimization plans taking into account the
quantity constraints in some markets. However, there are several ways how to
formulate this process. Drèze (1975) defined the effective demands as the
optimal quantity to maximize utility with quantity limit (the upper and lower
bounds). Within the bounds you can trade as much as you want. Therefore,
there are no excess effective demand or supply left in the Dfeze equilibrium.
This is unsatisfactory when we discuss disequilibrium measures such as un-
employment and excess capacity of plants. Benassy (1975) proposed the effective
demand for the ith good as the amount of the ith good which maximizes the
utility given the quantity constraints in all the markets other than the ith.
Since economic agents have to solve the different maximization problems as
many times as the number of the commodities, the budget constraint does not
hold in the effective demand level. This is not satisfactory from the view-
point of rationality.
The undesirable features in the Drze or Benassy equilibrium lead
researchers to investigate the so-called stochastic rationing schemes. The
realization after the announcement of the effective demands are stochastic.
Svensson (l977)discussed a stochastic rationing scheme and individual decision
making but he did not proceed to establish the market expectational equi-
librium which guarantees the rationing scheme is correct in the statistical
sense in the market.1—2
Douglas Gale (1977) and Jerry Green (1978) gave the most general
treatment of the stochastic rationing equilibria, where individuals in the
pure exchange economy have the probability distributions on the realization
of his effective demands. With some conditionson the expectation of
rationing given the actions taken by other agents Gale and Green showed
the existence of the stochastic rationing equilibria.
Although their equilibria show that the budget constraint should be
met in the effective demand level, it does not mean thestochastically
realized trade is such that everybody balance thebudget. Moreover, Gale
showed the existence of the non-trivial equilibria, but the sufficientcondition
is rather vague to be meaningfully interpreted, wherethe trivial equilibrium
is the no-action equilibrium.
In this paper, we specify our economy as anoverlapping generations
model with production and the government. We impose theex post budget
constraint and the ex post production constraint rather thanones in terms of
effective demands. This gives the possibility of discussion ofdisequilibrium
dynamics in the long-run. We also show a meaningful sufficient condition
for the non-trivial equilibria.
This framework has also am interesting feature that there may exist
a non-Walrasian equilibrium at the Wairasian equilibrium prices, even though
expectations and agents are perfectly (trational.?? This is confirmed by a
numerical example in the appendix. Note that in our framework, this phenomenon
is caused by the pure pessimism, in contrast to Heller and Starr (1979) whose
example of the same effect is not quite correct in that they allow the money
endowments to vary (hence money prices are 'wrong' though relative prices of
goods are correct.")1—3
Temporary equilibrium mod&Ls withir overlapping generations have
been studied by Grandmont and Laroque (1973), Fuchs and Laroque(1976),
and Fuchs (1976). They assume that prices move fastenough to clear
the spot markets within a period. They define the stationary marketequilibrium
of the series of prices for the relevant length of time generating thepresent
expected price equal to that price. They showed the conditions for the existence
of the stationary market equilibrium; its Pareto efficiency, the local
stability of the economy near the equilibrium with respect to the charac-
teristics of its agents and a money stock; and the structural stability with
respect to the expectations.2-1
2. Framework and Notations
Our economy is composed of four different types of economic agents:
H consumers in each of the young and old generation; firms; and thegovern-
ment. There are I different consumption goods and one type of factor of
production named labor. The government issues money which is used as the
medium of exchange and as the store of value. A young consumer is endowed with
no initial money balance and the positive potential labor force. The young
supplies labor, demands consumption goods and saves for the next period. An
older consumer with carried-over money balance does not work any more but
just consumes before the end of the life. Each of I consumption goods are
produced by F identical firms. The production technology of each industry
is characterized by a well-behaved neo—classical production function, f'(.)
The prices of the consumption goods, (P1,P2
,P1)and the nominal
wage, w, are fixed within a period. The aggregate demand and supply Isignals?!
for each market, are announced and distributed among the economic agents
without costs. Y and denote the aggregate demand and supply signal in
the ith market, respectively, and Ld and LS denote those of the labor market,
respectively. According to the aggregate signals and the individual effective
demand (or supply), the economic agent faces the stochastic rationing of trade.
An individual agent is assumed to take the aggregate signals as given and to
think that his individual effective demand is so small compared to the market
signals thatchange in his own individual effective demand is negligible. This
assumption is similar to the price-taker assumption in the Walrasian economy.
The realization of trades occur after all the economic agents submit their
effective demands and supplies. The stochastic rationing mechanism will be
defined in the next section.2-2
Let us sketch the economic agents decision-making. Consuiners,whether
they are young or old, maximize their expected utility. Older consumers,
(k=1,...,H ) planwhich goods they should order out of the pre-
determined money balance which is the consequence of the preceding period.
Young consumers (h =1,...,H)have to take into account the possibility of
future rationing as well as the present one. A consumer, h, submits his
effective demand for the ith, consumption goods, y, and his effective supply
of labor, ,aftermaximizing the expected utility function with the budget
contraint in the "worst" case of rationing possibility. Therefore, the
effective demand (or supply) is the amount up to which the consumer is "ready"
to buy (or sell). Since an older consumer is not allowed to work, a younger
consumer plans the non-negative money balance for all possible cases of ration-
ing.
A firm, f,-in the ithindustrywhich is assumed to be risk-neutral
maximizes its expected profit. It submits the effective demand for labor,
and the effective supply of the consumption goods, y.Theeffective
demand for labor and the effective supply of the goods have to be technologi-
cally possible in the "worst" rationing case, i.e., the maximum possible
assignment of sales and the minimum assignment of hiring labor. Therefore,
theeffective demand and supply are again the amounts that the firm is "ready"
to accept.
Since all the markets meet simultaneously,the effective demand and
supplyis final once they are submitted. The origin is assumed to be included
in the production possibility set, hence the firms never plan the negative
expected profit. However, the realization of events may be such that a firm
incurs losses from hoarding the excess labor relative to restrictive rationing2-3
on sales. Considering that some firms do make losses in the real world, we
do not think this is a bad assumption. We assume that all the realized profits
and losses are taxed or subsidized by the government. Therefore, the only
store of value available for the young generation is money. The government
demands the constant amount of the consumption goods (y, y, ..., y)and
labor services
A temporary equilibrium with stochastic rationing, given the fixed prices,
is defined as the signals of aggregate demands and supplies which induce economic
agents to submit individual effective demands and supplies which exactly summed
up to the signals.
Definition 2.1
A temporary equilibrium with stochastic rationing is the set of the quantity
signals with the following conditions:
=yh+ wherey(a)(a)
F f f =y(a) where y(a)
f=l
d I F f f
L= 9.(a) +g where 2.(a)
1=1 f=l
1
s h h h L = (a) where 9.(a)ç.(a)
h=l1
d d d s sd S.
a Y1 Y1 ,,;Lt,L)
wherea subscript t denotesperiod t,anddenote individual demand and supply
correspondences.2-4
In this kind of expectational equilibrium, we usually have the trivial
equilibrium of no-action (see Gale (1977), the last section). That is, if
the signals show zero aggregate demand and supply, then individuals feel they
cannot sell anything. This gives zero purchasing power and zero effective
demands. Therefore, the signals with zero demand and supply are confirmed as
an equilibrium. We are going to show that the existence of government and
the old generation with sure purchasing power, the rationing probability
distribution function bounded away from zero, and the well-behaved production
functions are enough to prove that the trivial equilibrium vanishes.3-1
3. Stochastic Rationing
Let us describe the stochastic rationing scheme we are going to adopt.
The firm announces its "effective demand't for labor, and its "effective
supply" of the ith consumption goods, y. The consumer announces his
"effective demand" for the consumption goods, (y1, y,...,y')and his
"effective supply" of labor, h Since the prices are fixed during the period
there is stochastic rationing in the market to make trades feasible.
Rationing is an assignment of trade, which is called "realization," by random
drawing according to a known distribution. We are going to adopt the following
axioms established by Green (1978):
I) The probability distribution of rationing to the jth agent in the ith (or
labor) market depends only on the jth effective demand (or supply) and the
quantity signals of the ith market. That is, the distribution is indepen-
dent across the markets. Moreover, the distributions are the same if
the agents in the same market offer the same effective demand (or supply).
II) Rationing does not change the side of the market i.e., a demander remains
buying the goods, and a supplier selling the goods.
III) Agents are not forced to buy (or sell) more than the amount they announce
as the effective demand (or supply).
IV) The mean of the probability distribution of rationing balances demand
and supply.
V)The probability distribution of rationing is continuous when endowed
with the topology of weakly convergence.3-2
The fourth condition requires that the realized trade balances only
its "mean." It is debatable whether we can actually devise a rationing scheme
which balances "realized" aggregate demand with supply "with certainty"
keeping individual rationing stochastic. We will come back to this point
later.
The fifth condition is the standard technical assumption.
Green showed that the rationing scheme satisfying the above axioms is
representable in the following form:
.ff-f fd S
y. =y.s. (y., Y., Y.) 1 1 1 1 1 1
-hh .hhd s =s \'
(3.1)
-f f -.ff d s =Js L,L)
= hh Ld, LS)
where and y are the effective supply from firm f, and the effective demand
from household h in the ith consumption goods market; 4isthe effective labor
demand from the firm f in the ith industry; and h is the effective labor
from household h;are stochastic functions depending on the individual effec-
tive demand and the market quantity signals. The stochastic rationing functions
have the means which are independent of the induvidual offers.
Notice that all the firms in the ith industry are identical in the
production function and behavior. Therefore, we have the following simplified
stochastic rationing function:3-3
-.f£ -f d s
yi =y.s. (Y., Y.)
We also assume the similar rationing function on the other side of the market
and also in the labor market. There we have
-ff -f d S = (YY1)
hh h d s
i (Y1, ,)
(3,1')
4= 4 4 (Ld,LS)
(Ld, LS)
This is an ad hoc assumption, which implies that an economic agent expects
the proportional rationing independent of his action.
In order to ensure the axioms above, we have certain requirements on
the supports of the probability distributions.
Assumption 3.1
o<< 1 V, Vf with probability one
-h
. o <s. h' with probability one
o<4<1 V, Vf. with probability one
0 << 1 V, h' with probability one3-4










Although Assumption 3.1 is necessary to ensure the axioms II) and III),
it seems too weak an assumption to derive a meaningful equilibrium. The com-
bination of this assumption with the budget constraint and the production
feasibility in the "worst" cases will end up with the trivial equilibrium. We
are going to assume stronger assumptions about the response of distributions
to the aggregate signals.
A usual assumption in the disequilibrium macroeconomics is that the
trade is realized at the short side of the market. This assumption implies
that the probability distribution is degenerate at unity for agents in the
short side of the market. For example, suppose that the excess demand
prevai1s in the ith market. And as the disequilibrium deepens, the
long side anticipates the "worse" distribution. We are going to characterizethis idea by putting restrictions on the upper bound and the lower bound
of the support of the probability distribution. The following are the
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(sI) m (Y., Y.),continuouswith respect to its arguments
(S)m =mZ(Ld,LS) , continuouswith respect to its arguments
Example
We will give an example of a rationing scheme in an economy where
all firms in an industry and all consumers are identical. The following
rationing scheme preserves the equal treatment of individuals (i.e., the
name does not matter), rational expectations on the quantity rationing scheme,
the randomness for individuals; and balances of the aggregate demand and
supply not only in the mean but also in realization with probability one.
The rationing scheme also preserves the above-mentioned assumptions on the
support of the distribution.
Take the representative firm in the ith consumption good market:
his stochastic realization of supply, y is now the effective demand multi-
plied by a stochastic "rationing number" s which depends on the market
signals. is distributed uniformly between and in the following








=-1/2+3d12s if 1/2 < < 1
=d12s if 0 <Y/Y<1/2
We also need one technical assumption. There is an even number of
firms. Now we explain the procedure of rationing. Suppose the market signal,
is less than one.(I) First stage is to make the lottery tickets
stochastically: we are going to create F (an even number of firms) tickets.
For the first ticket, draw a random number between s and s. The second
ticket is s+(s-n)wheren is the number of the first ticket. Repeat m m 1 1
this process F/2 times; (II) The second stage is the random drawing to decide the
ordering of firms to draw the prepared tickets; (III) The third stage is that
the first firm decided by the second stage draw randomly one ticket from the
urnpreparedby the first stage, and the drawn ticket is removed from the
urn. Repeat the process F times to exhaust firms and tickets.
By the first stage, the sum of the rationing tickets add up to
sF FY'/Y with certainty. Each firmisassumed to submit the same effective
f . . .fds demand y. That means that the actual rationing is Fy Y /Y .Fromthe
definition of temporary equilibrium with stochastic rationing,yf =
Therefore,the aggregate realization of rationing is always d That is,
the rationing scheme balances the aggregate demand and supply in realization
with probability one. However, from the individual point of view, the ration-
ing is stochastic and the distribution of rationing number is exactly ex-
plained above. Although the third stage of drawing means that a distribu-
tion of rationing tickets is dependent on other drawings, the second stage3-9
erases this problem. Hence, the identical distribution of rationing with
anonymity as a whole system is preserved.
Note also that s, and s are continuous with respect to d and
yS for d >0and >0,and satisfy assumptions made.4—i
4. The Firms' Behavior
There are F firms in each of I industries of consumption goods.
All the firms in the ith industry are identical. The representative firm f
in the ith industry produces output by the actual labor input 4
The production technology is represented by the neoclassical production
function with the following properties:
Assumption 4.1
By the actual input, 4 ,thefirmcanproduce the actual output,
y. ,whichis
f1(f)> y>0 for >0 V. V - i1— i— if
Assumption 4.2
f'(O) =0 V. -
Thefirst assumption means there is no technological externality. The
second assumption means that we cannot produce anything without inputs, or
that no action is possible.
Assumption 4.3
I f . . . f(2..)isa concave and increasing function.
or alternatively,42
Assumption 4.3'
f1(f)isa strictly concave and increasing function.
Assumption 4.4 [Well behavednessj
(i) There exists a continuous first derivatives for f', V.
(ii)f(0) =
(iii) f'() =0
These are the standard neo-classical assumptions on a production
function.
Now we can set up the maximization problem. The representative firm's
decision is to maximize the expected profit:







Herethe rationing proportions and their bounds are without superscript £ by axiom
ic Green (see p. 3-1 above). The same will be done later for consumers.4-3
(4.4)means that in the "realization" terms, the firm has to be able
to fulfill its promise of effective supply even if the most rationing in
hiring labor and the least rationing in sales happen to be the case. Con-
sidering that we are maximizing the profit,
(4.5) y =(l/.)f1(9)
substituting (4.5) into (4.1)
Max £ P.f'(2s )s./s. -ws
11—i 1 1 1
1
The first order condition is
(4.6) P.(s.) f'(2)/. -w(s)
=0
Sincethemarket signals are exogenous to the firm, Assumption 4.3 guaran-
tees that {i} satisfying (4.6), say { ()*} maximizes the expected profit.
Assumptions 4.1 and 4.4 imply (9)* is strictly positive but finite, if
LS > 0 and Y > 0
By assumptions 3.3 and 3.4 and 4.4, we find the upper hemi-continuous
correspondence ' from the space of the quantity signals to the space of the
effective demand for labor and the effective supply of the ith consumption
goods.
= (Y; Y; Ld;LS) V(P1, w) 0
f f Y. =. (.) 1 1 yi V(P,w)>>05-7
If so, let [y(n),(n)] c line segment between [)(n),(n)] and
suchthat
wt(n)(n)s t(at(n) -.p.(n)y.(n).( (n)) =0
Such a point clearly exists and satisfies
Finally, it is routine to check that in all cases




is a compact-valued, convex-valued and continuous corres-
pondence in the set i,t+l
>0V} ,when(&,y,Z) is given
and satisfies w -i=1 ()> 0. Lower hemi-continuity
may fail if the last assumption is violated.
Proof: Entirely routine. QED
There are, thus, some problems with continuity, which will be dealt with
later.
The next step is to relate expected future signals tt÷l to current ones
This is done in the usual way (Grandmont) (1977 or 1978)): has a
probability distribution which depends continuously on in the topology of
weak convergence of probability measures. Let p(czt) be the distribution of
givenc. The problems of non-continuity, especially in lemma 5.2,
necessitate the following assumptions.4-5
Proposition 2.2 [Continuity or Single-valued Mapping]
Suppose Assumptions 3.1-3.4 and 4.1-4.4 with assumption 4.3' instead
of 4.3, thenis single-valued.
Proof is trivial
Proposition 2.3 [Positive Response]
If >0andLS>0,then c. >0, > 0 1 y1 Li
Proofis obvious from Assumption 3.3(u)5-1
5. The Consumer's Behavior
Let us now consider a representative consumer h. To begin with we
introduce the notations with subscript t:
o effectivedemand for good i by consumer h at period t,
o< = effectivesupply of labor by h at period t,
=aggregateeffective demand for good i at period t,
L =aggregateeffective supply of labor at period t.
Similarly, we denote by'Lthe aggregate demand for labor. They will
appear as signals in the rationing mechanisms. Also, we let
o< Lh=theendowment of labor of consumer h, —t
=priceof good i at period t,
w =nominalwage at period t,
=realizedpurchases of good i by consumer h at period t,
=realizedsales of labor by consumer h at period t.
Finally, if subscriptis dropped the notation signifies the corresponding
I-dimensional vector, where I is the number of goods in each period.
At each period a generation of consumers h =1,...,His born. They
live for two periods. In the 1st period a consumer sells labor and buys goods.
In the 2nd period he is retired and only buys goods with money balances he
has carried forward from the 1st period of his lifetime. No planned bequests5—2
exist, so a household has no initial money balances. Any involuntary be-
quests caused by rationing are taxed away by the government.
Since realizations are random it is natural to assume that the house-
hold has a preference relation h over probability distributions of
realizations. We shall adopt the simpler hypothesis of expected utility






represents ht' where .iisthe probability distribution of consequences.
() willbe taken to be concave. (For a further discussion of this issue
see Grandmont (1972, 1977 and 1978) .)
Torelate realized transactions to effective demands and supplies we
follow the approach of Green (1978) with one further simplification: the
(stochastic) fractions of effective demand/supply that are realized are
independent of the effective demand/supply of each individual consumer. The
fractions do depend on aggregate effective demand and supply in the market.
The assumptions of sign-preservation, continuity, etc. made by Green (1978) hold.
Let t÷1' denote the random elements in the rationings in each period. Then,
we have





-h h - d s =
(,÷' Y111,' i=1...,I
where the aggregate signals in period (t +1)are now perceptions by the agent.
Note that the proportions of rationing do not depend on the agent and the
feasibility and budget constraints that each consumer has to obey are the
followings:








where 0isthe zero vector and the notation for vector inequalities is the
familiar one >> ,>>
Almost surely with respect tow,
- -h -h
m =w





where is the ith price of period (t + 1) anticipated at period t,
and tm+l is the effective demand of the ith consumption goods from household
h in generation t placed in period (t + 1) .Condition(II) rules out the- 5-4
possibility of bankruptcy or default. This is so because they are assigned
undefined expected disutility (compare Green (1978)). Note also that the
second inequality in (II) involves effective demands rather than
realizations. This is natural since a consumer does not plan any bequests,
and furthermore, realization will never exceed the demand.
Let us now introduce notations for the signals that influence the behavior
of the consumer. Let
I - d s d s - = ''w ).(L,Lt)) w;c) i—i
d s =
i,t+l'
bethe signals of period tandthe signals of (t+1) anticipated at period t.










be the set of possible actions by the consumer.
We make the following assumptions
Assumption 5.1




Here the bounds may depend on and do so continuously.
Then we have the following situation:










Since the rationing mechanism is sign-preserving,realizations are always non-
negative whenever the effective demands are non-negative, i.e.,
>e, >0, >0are guaranteed. Therefore,
Lemma 5.1
is a compact-valued, convex-valued and upper hemi-continuous
correspondence. It is also lower hemi-continuous V for which >05-6
Proof: Upper hemi-continuity is shown in Green. Each image set is convex-
valued since we have the rationing proportion, s, independent of the individual
effective demands, unlike Green. For lower hemi-continuity, let
- oo h- +c()as n - andchoose (y ,.Q)(ct()). We have two
possibilities:
1) Pt 5itt( >
0
Then for all n >n—0
- >0
and we can choose
[y(n), L(n)] =(y°,L°) >
(0, 0), n < no
2) -.p.t(oo)y°s.t(c(co))
=0.Since ) > 0
there exist [y(n), 2.(n)J such that the corresponding physical realization
requirements hold and w(n)i(n)(&(n) - > 0
There are now two possibilities for a given n.






If so, let [y(n),(n)] c line segment between [)(n),(n)] and
suchthat
wt(n)(n)s t(at(n) -.p.(n)y.(n).( (n)) =0
Such a point clearly exists and satisfies
Finally, it is routine to check that in all cases




is a compact-valued, convex-valued and continuous corres-
pondence in the set i,t+l
>0V} ,when(&,y,Z) is given
and satisfies w -i=1 ()> 0. Lower hemi-continuity
may fail if the last assumption is violated.
Proof: Entirely routine. QED
There are, thus, some problems with continuity, which will be dealt with
later.
The next step is to relate expected future signals tt÷l to current ones
This is done in the usual way (Grandmont) (1977 or 1978)): has a
probability distribution which depends continuously on in the topology of
weak convergence of probability measures. Let p(czt) be the distribution of
givenc. The problems of non-continuity, especially in lemma 5.2,
necessitate the following assumptions.5—8
(5.1)Va,










Any solution to the young consumer's optimization problem is such that
=wtz1'st(a)-lp...(cLt)y
>0when a0.
Proof: Assume the contrary. Then by construction E0
independently of .Onthe other hand, (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3) guarantee
that the consumer can obtain with certainty a positive amount of some good
inperiod t+l, if >0.This with (4)yield a contradiction.
QED
This proposition means that in considering h(a,cz+l) we can assume that
>0so that the continuity problem has been overcome in lemma 5.2.By
(5.3) we have that h(; .) iscontinuous for all 0.Tocomplete the
discussion of the young consumer's maximization problem we can appeal to the
results of Grandmont (1972, 1977) and see that the correspondence
giving current effective demands for goods and effective supply of labor is
a compact- and convex-valued uhc correspondence, when a 0 .Fora =05-9
we can define dh(at) arbitrarily, since realizations will always yield zeros
to the consunier.
To complete the picture, consider the old consumer,k's problem. Since
realizations of period t-l have taken place, he has an endowment of money o
and his problem is clearly




>0V, this will yield a compact-, convex-valued and uhc corres-
pondence Gk(c)6-1
6. Equilibrium and Non-triviality
So far we have not been very explicit about therange of values
(excluding the price components) can take. Theyare, however, important for the
fixed-point argument that follows, so we consider them in detail.
Current-period prices and wagesPt and w are taken to be fixed and positive.




give the bounds for a young consumer h, provided 0• Let be this
compact and convex set. Furthermore,if =0,then realizations are all zero
independently of the random element. Thus, in that case actionscould be
taken to satisfy the above inequalities as well.Thus, Vcit(yP)cKh
Similarly, for the old consumer k it is seen that
k k
0 < < m
'pit,
1= 1,...,I.
Thus,his actions also lie in a given compact and convex set when 0
Finally, for =0the above truncation argument holds again so yKkVc





wherein the vector of government demands
for goods. By constructing M is a compact, convex set.
Next, consider the producers. From section 2 we recall that the firm's
best-action correspondence is contained in a given compact and convex set
Nif cJR,wherewe have added zeros for those goods that the form doesn't
I Fif 1-.1 produce (i.e. ji).LetN =ilflN + whichis compact and convex.6-2
Finally, let us form K =Mx N. Then, it is clear that
=(y,L, Y, L) KC 2I+2




wherewe have smoothed the individual correspondences for the case =
(seee.g. Nikaido (1968, pp. 71-73)). Also, let 1'(c) be the aggregate cor-
responder of the producers (see section 4).
And, finally;
y(c) x {'(ct)
is the required uhc, compact- and convex-valued correspondence X : K --Kto
which we apply the fixed-point theorem of Kakutani. Hence, there exists
such that t*y() x 14(cL). An easy decomposition argument shows that
* s*
this is the required non-trivial equilibrium provided c is such that Lt >0.
To ensure that,consider the following argument.6—3
What would the rationing function for demand in a market look likewhen the
signal of aggregate supply is equal to zero. The plausibleanswer is that the
rationing degenerate at O} .Ifthere is any "rational" restriction in the
rationing functions, this must be the one. Similarly, if the signals for
aggregate demand in a market is equal to zero, then the rationing function for
the supply side of the market should degenerate at {O}.Therefore, if all the
aggregate signals are equal to zero {c} =O,0, ...,0},then the induced
aggregate demands and supplies are also zero, and this should be equilibrium.
This is called the "trivial equilibrium." However, in our framework, the
trivial equilibrium conflict with two assumptions we made earlier.First, the
government which has the power to finance by itself printing money demands a
positive amount of consumption goods and labor; Secondly, the older generation is at
least indifferent between putting down the deposit for effective demands and
carrying the money to a coffin. Therefore, cannot be a null-vector to begin
with since and L*d are necessarily strictly positive.We have from
assumption (5.3) that L*S0 which in turn induces firms to produce a
positive amount, by proposition 2.3. Therefore, our economy with the
government and the old generation who has money to spend and the well-behaved
production function generates a "non-trivial equilibrium." These assumptions
are compatible with Gale (1977: Theorem 3)
Since L >0,we see that the necessary smoothing (Lemmas 3.1-3.3) does
not create any problems i.e, c* does notbelong to the exceptional set. Hence,
we have proved the main theorem.
Theorem 6.1 There exists a non-trivial temporary equilibrium with stochastic
rationing.7-1
7. Stability and Dynamics: Open Question
We have shown the existence of a temporary equilibrium with stochastic
rationing. There are two steps in the research agenda we are going to proceedto
in the near future. First, we have to show the short-run stability of expecta-
tions on the aggregate signals. We ought to devise some mechanism to reach the
temporary equilibrium. This process is supposed to take placewithin a period
to ensure "rational expectations on rationing." Secondly, we would like to show
the long-run stability of price-adjustment. Although the prices are assumed to
be fixed within a period, they may change over time. Therefore, we would like
to show that the price dynamics in a sense does not "explode," or, moreover,
stay near the properly defined equilibrium.
The first problem corresponds to the tatonnement process in the Walrasian
(temporary) equilibrium. The only difference is that our tatonnement processis
done in the quantity terms instead of the prices space. The second problem has
been studied in a similar framework. Grandmont and Hildenbrandt (1974) used
an over-lapping generations model without rationing, i.e., Pt is adjusted to
clear the spot markets, but the endowments are random every period. They showed
that the price dynamics becomes the Markov process. Green and Majumbar (1975)
considered the model that prices are determined before the stochastic endowments
are revealed so that there may be the excess demands in a period, which,with
the current price, deterinines the price in the following period. They showed
the existence of a "stochastic equilibrium" as invariant probability distributions
of prices. Green and Majumdar allow the excess demand to prevail. However,
they did not provide any theory of how to carry out, if any,transactions when
there is excess demand. Therefore, our model can be regarded as giving arationale
for their model. But, note also that the quantity signals as well as the prices7-2
should be considered as the variables to describe dynamics in aproper framework.
This is the topic we are going to explore. An alternative way to handle the
above-mentioned two concepts of stability is that we allow the temporary
discrepancy between the aggregate signals announced at the beginning of the period
and the aggregate effective demand and supply. All other features are the same
within a period. The question to be asked then is whether the dynamics of the
quantity signals, the prices and the expectation formations on the both signals
(in the sense of Fuchs (1977)), are "stable."This seems to be very interesting
but complicated.
Finally, there is one more source of dynamics in the model, namely that of
savings, when one imposes a government budget constraint to the system. Böhm
(1978) and Honkapohja (1978) considered this issue in the context of a macro-
economic model of the Benassy type. It would be interesting to analyze similar
problems with the present framework, in particular, since expectation formation
is now explicit.8-1
8. Conclus:ions
The purpose of this paper was to develop a workable framework for the anal-
ysis of temporary equilibrium with stochastic rationing, which, so far, is the
most convincing framework about the formation of demands and supplies in the
context of non-clearing markets. Though perhaps the most interesting problems of
dynamics still await an answer, we were able to analyze the determination of a
temporary solution in some detail. In particular, an analysis shows that the
problem of non-triviality of equilibria can be overcome in a relatively simple way:
government expenditures provide the necessary signal for producers to produce
and hire inputs.
The example of a non—Walrasian equilibrium at the Walrasian equilibrium
prices raises some fundamental issues. The Keynesian multiplier storyis more than
a "deviation-amplifying' process at "wrong" prices. Indeed, even atthe Walrasian
equilibrium prices, the pure pessimism about trading opportunities can make
agents reduce their effective demands and hence create a recession.This should
be a subject of futher investigation.References:
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We will give an example of a non-Wairasian equilibrium with stochastic
rationing at the Walrasian equilibrium prices, which is reported in Ito (1979).
Example
Suppose the representative consumer with the following utility function,
u=2v1+2v'rri+
L denote the actual labor supplied and the disposable time
denotes the actual consumption goods bought;rn denotes the
money balance. The consumer maximizes (1) with respect to
subject to the budget constraint and the non—negativity constraint:
m =iii + wl-
(2)
m￿O,
where w ￿ 0 and, p ￿ 0 denote the nominal wage and the price of the consump-
tion goods; tdenotesthe initial money balance. The Walrasian demand for
the consumption goods, d (which is multi-valued at p =1in this example) and
the Walrasian supply of labor,5, are obtained as functions (or correspondences
to be precise) of the wage and the price.'2
The representative firm maximizes its profit,
(3) v=py-w
subject to the feasibility constraint,
(4) y ￿ f(J)
where f is a neoclassical production function dependent on the actual employ-
ment of the labor force, £.Thisgives the Wairasian demand for labor,
and the Wairasian supply of the consumption goods, S, as functions of the







Suppose the following numerical values for the parameters:
(5) =200,2= 400,and f() =20v7
The Wairasian equilibirum in this economy is defined as the price vector
(p*, w*) such that
=yS and d ps




Now keep the economic environment and the Wairasian prices intact, i.e.,
(1), (4), (5) and (p, w) =(1,1). However, the consumer and the firm
suddenly become pessimistic. They believe (i) that they are in the
Keynesian unemployment regime, i.e., the aggregate excess supply in the both
markets; (Ii) that the short-side of a market (i.e., demanders) can fulfill
their offers; (iii) that l0O'r% of workers are fully employed at their offers,
and 100(1 -w) %of workers are employed at a half of their offers;
(iv) that (1000 )%ofthe finns manage to sell everything they produce
to offer, while the rest can sell only (lOOs )%oftheir products, in such
a way that the mean of successful—sales proportion is
=+(1- , 0<< 1.
Both markets meet simultaneously at the beginning of a period and decide
randomly who are lucky to fulfill their supply and who are rationedJ
Taking into these constraints, the consumer maximizes the expected utility
to find the effective supply of labor, Les and the effective demand for the
consumption goods, yed:A-3





whereandare given in (5); p =1,w =1;and
(l/2/ —l/2/4)
(6)ir =_______________________________________
(1 / 2 f- 1/ 2 /4 + 1 / -1//b)
.70
The firm is assumed to be risk-neutral, wherefore they maximize the expected
profit with respect to the effective supply of the consumption goods, es and
the effective demand for labor, ed The average proportion of successful sales
becomes the "effective price" of products. Therefore the firm would reduce
their production plan. Moreover, the production plan should be feasible not
only on average but also in its offer, the (9,ed, yes) vector.
Max Ev =py-w2.
subjectto y< f(2,




Since we assume the rational expectations on rationing, i.e.,the economic
agents know an actual rationing scheme, we havethe mean balance condition,
ed es
2= + (1 -
(E)
ed =esA non-Wairasian equilibrium with stochastic rationing is defined as
a self-reproducing aggregate quantity signals (ydysLdLs)(5) Take
2OO()2N, yS =2OO()N,Ld =lOO()2N,LS =liON,where N is the
number of firms or consumers. It is easy to see that if (E) is satisfied
then (ydysLdLs) is a nori-Walrasian equilibrium.
In order to confirm that (E) is satisfied by the valuesgiven in (6) and
(7), we take the first order condition of the expectedutility maximization
problem, i.e., Eu2,= 0, where
Eu= Tr(l//ff1+ -l//+(1-)(l/2A÷7-i/2/-/2)
Observe that this is satisfied if 2e =110.The firm's expected maximiza-
tion yields the followings:
ed =lOO()2
es =2OO().
Given the values of (6) for itand(7) for ,(E)is satisfied
ed93 ,ees=llO
ed 186es 193